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Golden Gate and the Ninth Circuit’s Threat to
ERISA’s Uniformity and Jurisprudence
I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held1 that
San Francisco’s Health Access Program was not enacted in
contravention to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”).2 Since the Program’s enabling ordinance passes all of the
tests describing laws not preempted3 by ERISA,4 the court held that
the ordinance creates a permissible means for San Francisco to tax
employers and create employee health benefits for its residents.5
Nevertheless, while applying its tests, the Ninth Circuit overlooked
one of the main purposes of ERISA: “provid[ing] a uniform
regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.”6 Distracted by its
responsibility to uphold and preserve state and local autonomy,7 the
Ninth Circuit erred in its application of ERISA’s tests to the point
that it violated one of ERISA’s primary purposes—uniformity.

1. The Ninth Circuit was petitioned for a rehearing en banc and, in denying that
rehearing, issued Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 1000 (2009).
2. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 558 F.3d at 1004.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (stating that the “provisions of [ERISA] shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any” ERISA
plan).
4. ERISA’s ever-complicated and oft-challenged preemption has been the source of an
abundance of litigation. For an example of at least six cases in a five-year period where the
Supreme Court ruled on an ERISA preemption, see District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd.
of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992).
5. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 558 F.3d at 1001 (“No employer is required by the
Ordinance either to establish a new ERISA health care plan or to modify an existing ERISA
health care plan.”).
6. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004).
7. Although the dissent in Golden Gate’s denial of rehearing contends that the
majority’s primary distraction was its focus “on ERISA’s objective of protecting against misuse
of benefit plan funds,” 558 F.3d at 1009 (Smith, J., dissenting), this Note will focus on the
court’s “presumption against preemption.” While the dissent’s arguments pointing to that
distraction are interesting, the fact that the San Francisco Ordinance does little to encourage
the abuse of plan funds, and actually provides a means by which a greater portion of San
Francisco citizens may benefit from ERISA or similar plans, makes them less than compelling.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Impetus for ERISA
In the early 1960s, the once iconic American car manufacturer
Studebaker met its demise.8 During its colossal fall, Studebaker
“terminated its pension plan for more than 4,000 employees, leaving
many without promised benefits and with no recourse after 20 or
more years of work.”9 This mismanagement of pension benefits
became the impetus behind a bill proposed by Republican Senator
Jacob Javits in 1967, which later became ERISA.10
Congress signed ERISA into law on Labor Day in 1974.11 The
primary concern in pushing the enactment was “the mismanagement
of funds accumulated to finance employee benefits and the failure to
pay employees benefits from accumulated funds.”12 ERISA addressed
that primary concern through the establishment of two objectives.
First, it worked to protect employee benefits by establishing
“extensive reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duty requirements to
insure against the possibility that the employee’s expectation of the
benefit would be defeated through poor management by the plan
administrator.”13 Second, to assure its success, ERISA insulated itself
from any state meddling by eliminating all conflicting regulation
among the states—establishing uniformity among benefit plans by
preempting all other state laws.14 Although the first objective is
probably more important because it directly addresses Congress’s
concerns about employee benefits, the second goal has become a
more contentious point of law because it restricts state sovereignty in
regards to state employee benefit legislation.
Nevertheless, Congress viewed the preemption, and the
uniformity that it creates, as an absolute necessity for ERISA’s
success.15 Congress intended the preemption “to apply in its
8. See Claire A. Peterson, The Evolving Effect of ERISA on Managed Care Liability,
HOSP. TOPICS, Winter 2001, at 5, 5.
9. Id.
10. ERISA: A Well-Intentioned Reform Gone Wrong, FORTUNE, Sept. 12, 1988, at 146.
11. Id.
12. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989).
13. Id.
14. 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent) (“With the preemption
of the field, we round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of
conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation.”).
15. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) (“[T]he emergence
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broadest sense to all actions of state or local governments, or any
instrumentality thereof, which have the force or effect of law.”16
Consequently, ERISA’s preemption clause is “one of the broadest
preemption clauses ever enacted by Congress.”17 Unfortunately,
enforcing ERISA’s preemption and its consequential uniformity is
easier said than done. Indeed, “[d]eveloping a rule to identify
whether ERISA preempts a given state law—the first step in
determining whether ERISA completely preempts the law—has
bedeviled the Supreme Court.”18
B. The Application of ERISA
Determining the extent of ERISA’s preemption has created a
complicated mix of tests. According to the statutory language,
ERISA is supposed to preempt “any and all State laws insofar as
they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan.”19 However,
determining the scope of the seemingly simple term “relate” has
created several multi-part tests. First, the Supreme Court has broken
down the analysis by ruling that a “law ‘relate[s] to’ a covered
employee benefit plan for purposes of [ERISA] ‘if it [1] has a
connection with or [2] reference to such plan.’”20 Then, until Golden
Gate, the Ninth Circuit used its own multi-factor test to find a
“connection with” ERISA when:
(1) . . . the state law regulates the types of benefits of ERISA
employee welfare plans;

of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interests of uniformity with respect
to interstate plans required . . . the displacement of State action in the field of private employee
benefit programs.”).
16. 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams).
17. PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. W. Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 545 (9th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Evans v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 1437, 1439 (9th Cir. 1990)).
18. Rutledge v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 201 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th
Cir. 2000) (referencing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334–35 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Since ERISA was enacted
in 1974, this Court has accepted certiorari in, and decided, no less than 14 cases to resolve
conflicts in the Courts of Appeals regarding ERISA pre-emption of various sorts of state law.
The rate of acceptance, moreover, has not diminished.” (footnote omitted))).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
20. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement, 519 U.S. at 324 (quoting District of
Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992) (alterations in original)
(some internal quotations omitted)).
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(2) . . . the state law requires the establishment of a separate
employee benefit plan to comply with the law;
(3) . . . the state law imposes reporting, disclosure, funding, or
vesting requirements for ERISA plans; and
(4) . . . the state law regulates certain ERISA relationships,
including relationships between an ERISA plan and employer and,
to the extent an employee benefit plan is involved, between the
employer and employee.21

Finally, the Supreme Court completes the ERISA preemption
test with another two-part inquisition, determining that a law makes
an impermissible “‘reference to’ ERISA” if it (1) “acts immediately
and exclusively upon ERISA plans” or (2) “where the existence of
ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.”22
III. GOLDEN GATE II AND III
A. The San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance
In 2006, under the current state of ERISA, the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors unanimously approved, and Mayor Gavin
Newsom signed into law, the San Francisco Health Care Security
Ordinance (the “Ordinance”).23 With the ultimate design of
implementing an independent healthcare system,24 the Ordinance
has two essential parts. First, the Ordinance creates the Health
Access Program (“HAP”), which delivers health care “to uninsured
San Francisco residents, regardless of their employment status.”25
Second, and controversially, the San Franciscan government pays for
and administers such a comprehensive system by requiring
medium and large businesses [to] make minimum health care
expenditures on behalf of covered employees. . . . [In addition,
employers are required to] maintain “accurate records of health
21. Operating Eng’rs Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ Contracting Co., 135 F.3d
671, 678 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 12 F.3d 1498, 1504 (9th Cir.
1993)).
22. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement, 519 U.S. at 325.
23. S.F., CAL., MUN. CODE § 14 (Municipal Code Corp. 2009), available at
http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=14131&sid=5; Golden Gate Rest.
Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 535 F. Supp. 2d 968, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
24. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 970.
25. Id. at 971; see also S.F., CAL., MUN. CODE § 14.2 (Municipal Code Corp. 2009),
available at http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=14131&sid=5.
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care expenditures” and “proof of such expenditures,” allow
“reasonable access” by City officials to such records, and annually
report “such other information” that the City requires.26

The Ordinance permits employers to make these expenditures
through many different methods, including “direct reimbursement
to employees,” “payments to third parties for . . . health care
services,” and, most importantly for the sake of this Note,
contributions to ERISA plans.27 The city enforces these requirements
against employers through “significant penalties and presumptions
against employers.”28
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis
During both the first and second opportunities that the Ninth
Circuit had to review the San Francisco Ordinance, the court found
that ERISA did not preempt the law.29
1. The presumption against preemption
Before even beginning its analysis of the ERISA preemption
tests, the court noted that a presumption against preemption would
inform the whole of its analysis.30 According to the Ninth Circuit,
since “Congress did not intend ERISA to preempt areas of
traditional state regulation,”31 and since “[s]tate and local
governments have traditionally provided health care services” to
persons such as those cared for under the San Francisco ordinance,32
the court would operate under the presumption that the Ordinance
was beyond the reach of any preemption.33
The court then proceeded to examine the ERISA tests, finding
that the Ordinance does not “relate to” ERISA,34 and is therefore
26. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 970–71.
27. Id. at 970.
28. Id. at 971.
29. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008);
Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 588 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying the
association’s petition for rehearing en banc).
30. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 647.
31. Id. (quoting Rutledge v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 201 F.3d 1212,
1217 (9th Cir. 2000)).
32. Id. at 648.
33. See id. at 647.
34. See id.
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not preempted by the Act, for two reasons. First, the court held the
Ordinance does not have a prohibited “connection with” ERISA
because it does not impermissibly bind employers to a specific set of
rules or require them to adopt a plan different from the one that
they currently maintain.35 Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the
Ordinance does not make any unlawful references to ERISA because
it does not single out the statute itself, being able to operate
independent of ERISA36 by “not look[ing] beyond the dollar
amount spent, [or] . . . evaluat[ing] benefits derived from those
dollars.”37
2. “Connection with”
When applying the “connection with” prong, the Ninth Circuit
bypassed its broad factors test38 in order to apply a new, narrow
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.39 Noting that the
Ordinance at issue does not require any employers to either adopt or
change their current ERISA plans,40 the Ninth Circuit found it to be
entirely permissible.41 Moreover, according to the Ninth Circuit’s
reading of the Supreme Court’s decision in Travelers,42 any influence
that the Ordinance may have on employers by requiring them to
decide whether to pay the difference between their current plans and
their obligations under the Ordinance to either the city or their
current ERISA plans is an indirect and therefore entirely permissible
effect.43

35. Id. at 655–56.
36. Id. at 657.
37. Id. at 647.
38. See supra text accompanying note 23.
39. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 655–57.
40. Id. at 656 (observing that employers can make up the difference between the city
obligation and their ERISA payments by either increasing their ERISA plan payments or
paying the city directly).
41. Id. at 655–56 (“Any employer covered by the Ordinance may fully discharge its
expenditure obligations by making the required level of employee health care expenditures,
whether those expenditures are made in whole or in part to an ERISA plan, or in whole or in
part to the City.”); cf. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (“The statute binds
ERISA plan administrators to a particular choice of rules for determining beneficiary status.”).
42. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645 (1995).
43. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 656.
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3. “Reference to”
Proceeding to the “reference to” portion of the test, the Ninth
Circuit continued its narrow reading of Supreme Court precedent.44
Looking to Greater Washington45 and related cases,46 the court
noticed that the Ordinance, requiring only a minimum payment to
the city from all covered employers, “can have its full force and effect
even if no employer in the [c]ity has an ERISA plan.”47 Therefore,
the court concluded that since “the existence of ERISA plans is [not]
essential to the law’s operation,”48 it does not make an impermissible
“reference to” such plans.49
4. Rehearing en banc
The Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to reconsider this case
when the restaurateurs filed a petition for a rehearing en banc. The
petitioners, and the dissenters in the court’s denial of a rehearing, felt
that the Golden Gate II decision created a split between the Ninth
and Fourth Circuits and acted contrary to Supreme Court
precedent.50 Nevertheless, in a clearly written opinion, the panel
rejected the petition, as well as the idea that the Circuit’s previous
ruling put it at odds with any other decision.51 Unpersuaded by the
petitioner’s arguments, the Ninth Circuit maintained the view that
the Ordinance is not contrary to any precedent because it does not
obligate employers to make changes to their current ERISA plans,52
it does not make any reference to plan benefits, and it can operate
independent of ERISA.53

44. Id. at 657–59.
45. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 113 (1992).
46. Among those cases related to Greater Washington are Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) and WSB Electric, Inc. v. Curry, 88 F.3d 788 (9th Cir.
1996). However, for the sake of brevity and for argument’s purposes, this Note shall strictly
focus on Greater Washington.
47. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 657.
48. Id. (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)).
49. Id. at 658.
50. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 1000, 1002–03 (2009).
51. Id. at 1002 (Circuit Judge Fletcher stated curtly, “[t]he dissent makes several
contentions. I disagree with them all.”).
52. Id. at 1002–03.
53. See id. at 1003.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In spite of the Ninth Circuit’s well-reasoned efforts, the court
lost sight of one of the primary purposes of ERISA—creating nationwide uniformity among employee benefit plans.54 The Ninth
Circuit’s misguided effort to respect the sovereignty of states and
municipalities in their own traditional sphere caused the court to
issue an errant interpretation of two Supreme Court precedents, and
created a split between the Ninth and the Fourth Circuits.55
A. The Distraction
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides the basis for
federal preemption, allowing federal law to preempt state law when
they conflict, as well as when Congress either expressly or impliedly
calls for such preemption.56 Nevertheless, in spite of the complete
supremacy of federal law, the Supreme Court generally works under
the “assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are]
not to be superseded by . . . [a] Federal Act unless [it is] the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.”57 This general respect for
federalism, where “[t]he powers delegated . . . to the Federal
Government, are few and defined” and “[t]hose which . . . remain in
the State Governments, are numerous and indefinite,”58 is worthy of
praise. Indeed, such a system is desirable, encouraging states to
innovate and experiment for the eventual benefit of the rest of the
nation.59 Consequently, all state and local laws benefit from a
54. Id. at 1004 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“Our decision flouts the mandate of national
uniformity in the area of employer-provided healthcare that underlies the enactment of
ERISA.”).
55. Id.
56. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation and Dev. Comm’n, 461
U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
57. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added); accord Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); id. at 532–33 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
740 (1985); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R.
Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926).
58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 260 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
generally U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”).
59. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One of
federalism’s chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the
possibility that ‘a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
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presumption against ERISA’s preemption if they “clearly operate[]
in a field that ‘has been traditionally occupied by the states,’”60
meaning that they are generally controlled by a state’s police powers.
When the Ninth Circuit was tasked with discovering whether
ERISA preempted the Ordinance, while still respecting and
preserving the sovereignty of the states and municipalities, it found
an independent connection between the Ordinance and a
traditionally state regulated area—health care services.61 As a result,
the court felt that state and local powers justified the Ordinance and
failed to see how or why the Ordinance is preempted by ERISA.62
Nevertheless, just because a plan bears a strong connection to a
traditionally state-regulated area does not mean that the plan does
not deeply connect to and interfere with a ERISA plan, and is
therefore preempted. For example, although states retain strict
power over laws concerning divorce and probate proceedings,63 the
Supreme Court has found that such states laws are preempted to the
extent that they apply to ERISA plans.64 Even so, the distraction of
preserving state and local sovereignty led the Ninth Circuit to make a
myopic interpretation of the Supreme Court precedent in Travelers65

try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’” (quoting
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
60. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 (1997)
(quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)).
61. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 648 (9th Cir.
2008) (“The field in which the Ordinance operates is the provision of health care services to
persons with low or moderate incomes. State and local governments have traditionally
provided health care services to such persons.”).
62. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 583 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir.
2009) (“The purpose of ERISA is not to require national uniformity in the provision of health
care. Rather, its purpose is to ‘ensure [ ] that the administrative practices of a benefit plan will
be governed by only a single set of regulations.’” (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987))).
63. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (“One of the
principal areas in which this Court has customarily declined to intervene is the realm of
domestic relations. Long ago we observed that ‘[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations
of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of
the United States.’” (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890))).
64. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 143 (2001) (holding that a state statute
providing “that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset is revoked
automatically upon divorce” is preempted by ERISA).
65. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 654 (referring to N.Y. State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995)) (“We read
Travelers as narrowing the Court’s interpretation of the scope of § 514(a).”).
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and Greater Washington,66 opening the door for it to approve the
Ordinance in spite of the ERISA preemption.
B. The Miscues
1. Misreading Travelers
In Travelers, the United States Supreme Court encountered a
New York statute requiring “hospitals to collect surcharges from
patients covered by a commercial insurer but not from patients
insured by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan, and it subject[ed] certain
health maintenance organizations (HMO’s) to surcharges that
var[ied] with the number of Medicaid recipients each enroll[ed].”67
Obviously, such a plan could affect the “choices made by insurance
buyers, including ERISA plans.”68 However, as indicated by the
Supreme Court, ERISA did not preempt that statute.69 According to
the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court’s decision was supported by
three main factors: (1) health care is generally a regulated sector that
is reserved to the states,70 (2) the statute only exerted an indirect
influence on ERISA plans,71 and (3) the statute did “not bind plan
administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a
regulation of an ERISA plan itself.”72
While each factor listed by the Ninth Circuit plays an essential
role in determining ERISA’s preemption, the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation and application of Travelers is troubling. Applying its
understanding of Travelers to Golden Gate, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that since employers are not bound as to how they fulfill
their San Francisco obligations,73 the Ordinance’s influence is only
indirect and thus survives preemption.74

66. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992); see
Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 657–58.
67. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 649.
68. Id. at 659.
69. Id. at 649.
70. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d 639, 647 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Travelers
514 U.S. at 661 (“[N]othing in the language of [ERISA] or the context of its passage
indicates that Congress chose to displace general health care regulation, which historically has
been a matter of local concern.”)).
71. Id. at 656.
72. Id. (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659).
73. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 546 F.3d at 656 (“[The Ordinance’s] only influence is on
the employer who, because of the Ordinance, may choose to make its required health care
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Not only is the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning dubious, but such an
interpretation contrasts directly with the Fourth Circuit’s conception
of Travelers’ indirect influence doctrine. Understanding that ERISA
preempts all employee benefit plans “established or maintained . . .
by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity
affecting commerce,”75 the Fourth Circuit in Fielder76 explains that
the target of the New York statute in Travelers was not employers,
but insurance companies.77 The statute itself “did not act directly
upon employers or their plans,”78 or “bind plan administrators to any
particular choice.”79 Essentially, the indirect influence of the New
York statute came by specifically targeting “hospitals’ charges to
insurance companies . . . only indirectly affect[ing] the prices ERISA
plans would pay for insurance policies.”80 Conversely, any law that
“directly regulates employers’ structuring of their employee health
benefit plans, [creating a] tighter causal link between the regulation
and employers’ ERISA plans,”81 is strictly preempted, whether the
employer is bound to a specific choice or not.82
Disregarding the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, the Ninth Circuit
focused on the differences between the Ordinance and the law in
Fielder,83 failing to see this split developing.84

expenditures to an ERISA plan rather than to the City.”).
74. Id. (“[T]he influence exerted by the [San Francisco] Ordinance is even less direct
than the influence in Travelers.”).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2008) (emphasis added).
76. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007).
77. Id. at 195.
78. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659 (1995)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129–30 (1992)
(“ERISA pre-empts any state law that . . . has a connection with covered benefit plans . . .
‘even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only indirect.’”
(quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990))).
83. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir.
2009) (“Far from imposing a de facto obligation on an employer to establish or alter an
ERISA plan [such as the law in Fielder], the [San Francisco] Ordinance offers an employer a
meaningful choice.”).
84. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 659 (9th Cir.
2008) (“We see no inconsistency between the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Fielder and our
holding in this case.”); Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 558 F.3d at 1002 (“The Maryland law [in
Fielder] contrasts sharply with the San Francisco Ordinance.”).
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Although the Ordinance provides a benefit to the people and is
based in a sector where control is generally reserved to local
government—because it allows employers to pay their city
obligations through ERISA plans—it exerts an unlawful influence on
San Francisco employers, requiring them to decide whether they
should “[m]ake a payment to the government or change [their]
current ERISA plan.”85 Such a “connection with” ERISA is expressly
preempted.
2. Misreading Greater Washington
In addition to the Ninth Circuit’s misreading of Travelers, the
distraction of state sovereignty caused the court to make another
critical mistake in finding a “critical distinction” between the San
Francisco Ordinance and the ordinance in Greater Washington.86 In
Greater Washington, an ordinance in “[t]he District of Columbia
require[d] employers who provide health insurance for their
employees to provide equivalent health insurance coverage for
injured employees eligible for workers’ compensation benefits.”87
This coverage was supposed to be at the “same benefit level that the
employee had at the [moment he or she] was eligible to receive
workers’ compensation benefits.”88 Because this ordinance measured
its coverage by the benefits of an employee’s current benefit plan (an
ERISA plan), the court held that ERISA preempted the measure.89
According to the Ninth Circuit, the fact that the Greater
Washington ordinance measured an employer’s obligations by
reference to the benefits provided by an ERISA plan, whereas in this
case, the Ordinance measures an employer’s obligations by reference
to payments that he or she has already made to an ERISA plan,
makes all the difference.90 The Ninth Circuit held that this
distinction allows “the Ordinance [to] have its full force and effect
even if no employer in [San Francisco] has an ERISA plan,”91 and
“[w]here a law is fully functional even in the absence of a single

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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ERISA plan . . . , it does not make an impermissible reference to
ERISA plans.”92
However, such a narrow reading fails to accurately reflect the
short, but broad, opinion expressed in Greater Washington.93 Quite
simply, any ordinance that “specifically refers to welfare benefit plans
regulated by ERISA . . . on that basis alone is pre-empted.”94 While
the San Francisco Ordinance can function independent of ERISA,
any employer with a current ERISA plan must nevertheless reference
it to calculate its San Francisco obligations.95 The existence of ERISA
plans becomes, therefore, essential to the law’s operation96 because
the Ordinance imposed an obligation on employers while making an
unlawful reference to ERISA.97
C. The Implications
At this juncture, the Ninth Circuit has been so adequately
distracted by the alternative objective of preserving local autonomy
that it has devalued ERISA’s preemption clause. As with any
important case, Golden Gate has attracted a certain amount of
attention predicting its consequences.98 The bulk of that attention
focuses on the two primary results or implications.
First, this decision clears a path for policy-makers to establish
state and municipal health plans normally preempted by ERISA and
destroys an essential goal of the law.99 Precedent has repeatedly
92. Id. at 659.
93. Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court in Greater Washington was only six pages
long in U.S. Reports.
94. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992); id.
at 129–30 (“ERISA pre-empts any state law that . . . has a connection with covered benefit
plans . . . ‘even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only
indirect.’” (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990))).
95. S.F., CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 14.1(b)(7), 14(3) (2009), available at http://www.
municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=14131&sid=5.
96. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997).
97. Greater Washington, 506 U.S. at 130–31 (“[A]ny state law imposing requirements
by reference to such covered programs must yield to ERISA.”).
98. See, e.g., The ERISA Industry Committee, Ninth Circuit Ruling on San Francisco
Health Ordinance Threatens Employer-based Health System, STATE NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 10,
2009,
available
at
http://www.eric.org/forms/documents/DocumentFormPublic/
view?id=18113000000FF.
99. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir.
2009) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur decision here creates . . . a roadmap for the enactment of
numerous conflicting health care laws affecting national employers, the very situation Congress
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stated that uniformity across state employee benefits laws is an
unquestionable purpose of ERISA.100 Nevertheless, under Golden
Gate, all national companies with branches in San Francisco—and
possibly elsewhere in the near future101—will be required to manage
both federal benefit obligations as well as local benefit obligations.
Now that Golden Gate has shown state and local governments how
to successfully circumnavigate ERISA’s preemption, there is little left
to preserve uniformity among benefits plans.
Second, the means by which the Ninth Circuit in Golden Gate
arrived at its conclusion may lead to additional erroneous
interpretation of ERISA’s jurisprudence. In a common law system,
“the misapplication of the principles of [a law’s] interpretation can
create bad precedents.”102 Such bad precedents perpetuate as courts
strove to avoid when it enacted ERISA.”); Associated Press, S.F.’s Universal Health Plan
Upheld, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), Oct. 1, 2008, at A6 (quoting a statement
attributed to San Francisco City Attorney Dennis Herrera, “This [decision] is a road map for
state and local governments so they can step into the void and fill the vacuum that the federal
government has left because of its inability to act in this area.”).
100. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (“The purpose of ERISA is
to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.”); N.Y. State Conference
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995) (“The
basic thrust of the pre-emption clause [is] to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to
permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.”); Fort Halifax
Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987) (stating that a principal goal of ERISA is to
enable employers “to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of . . .
claims and disbursements of benefits”); id. at 11 (“[ERISA’s] [p]reemption [clause] ensures
that the administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by only a single set of
regulations.”); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 149–50 (2001) (“Requiring ERISA
administrators to master the relevant laws of 50 States and to contend with litigation would
undermine the congressional goal of ‘minimiz[ing] the administrative and financial burden[s]’
on plan administrators—burdens ultimately born by the beneficiaries.” (alterations in original)
(quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990))); Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
498 U.S. at 142 (“Requiring the tailoring of plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities of
the law of each jurisdiction[,] . . . is fundamentally at odds with the goal of uniformity that
Congress sought to implement.”); id. (“Section 514(a) was intended to ensure that plans and
plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize
the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States
or between States and the Federal Government. Otherwise, the inefficiencies created could
work to the detriment of plan beneficiaries.” (citing FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60
(1990))).
101. Heather Knight, Supreme Court Asked to Ax Health Care Law, S.F. CHRON., June
9, 2009, at B2 (stating that San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom, hoping to run for governor
of California, is planning to implement his plan in the rest of the state in spite of its ongoing
judicial challenges).
102. Miriam R. Albert, Common Sense for Common Stock Options: Inconsistent
Interpretation of Anti-Dilution Provisions in Options and Warrants, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 321,
355 (2003).
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base future decisions upon those bad decisions. This Note has
demonstrated that much of Golden Gate is established upon the
Ninth Circuit’s erroneous interpretations of Supreme Court
precedent. As it stands, Golden Gate “undercuts the Supreme
Court’s ERISA preemption case law,”103 and creates a false
foundation upon which other courts may build, to continue ERISA’s
destruction.
V. CONCLUSION
In Golden Gate, the Ninth Circuit’s efforts to uphold and honor
a municipality’s rights to sovereignty and self-determination, in the
context of deciding an ERISA preemption controversy, diverted its
attention from the fundamental purposes of the Act. Central to
ERISA’s implementation is its preemption and the nationwide
uniformity that preemption is supposed to create for employee
benefit plans. This distraction led the Ninth Circuit to misinterpret
two important Supreme Court decisions and thereby create a split
among the circuits. In addition, the court’s interpretation endangers
ERISA benefit plan uniformity and lays a foundation of false
precedent for the building of new ERISA law until Congress or the
Supreme Court rectifies the Ninth Circuit’s error. It appears that in
the fight for universal healthcare, the Ninth Circuit was San
Francisco’s greatest ally in getting around a law that has, for so long,
impeded many other local governments from implementing their
own plans.
Landon Wade Magnusson

103. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n, 558 F.3d at 1010 (Smith, J., dissenting).
 J.D. candidate, April 2010, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
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